Conversion vs. Tolerance: Minority-focused influence strategies can affect group loyalty

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Conversion vs. Tolerance: Minority-focused Influence Strategies Can Affect Group Loyalty

Emily S. Shaffer and Radmila Prislin

Abstract
Past research has documented that social change has different implications for group identification when it is effected through successful minority’s advocacy for tolerance of diversity vs. conversion of opponents to supporters. Extending these findings, the current study demonstrated that minorities who successfully advocated tolerance, compared to those who successfully converted opponents, were more loyal to the group. This was evident in their working harder for the group at their own personal expense and without expecting anything in return. The effect of influence strategy on group loyalty was mediated by evaluative and cognitive components of group identification. Implications for group dynamics in which active minorities employ different influence strategies and their motivational underpinnings are discussed.

Keywords
group loyalty, minority influence

The power of minorities to influence individuals, though under a highly circumscribed set of conditions, has been well established in social psychological literature. Moscovici pioneered the movement of research from majority influence to minority influence. He and his colleagues challenged the conformity literature of Asch (1956), arguing that behavioral consistency in minority advocacy allows minorities to exert influence (Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969). Moscovici’s (1980) conversion theory postulates that differences in opinions of majorities and minorities inspire conflict and that majorities, intrigued by the uniqueness of the minority position, may examine the divergent opinion more closely. Change may then take place if the arguments presented by the minority are cogent. Over time, if these conditions are met, a majority may begin to acknowledge the minority position. Subsequent research has elucidated and expanded upon this literature showing that minority influence is more likely to take place through indirect routes. That is, minorities are most successful in influencing majorities when it is not readily apparent that they are siding with the minority (Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, San Diego State University, USA

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Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994). Research has also outlined a set of conditions under which minorities can exert influence, and the processes underlying the effects of minority advocacy on attitudes and attitude change among members of the majority (see Butera & Levine, 2010; Hewstone & Martin, 2009, for current reviews).

Minority influence research, conducted within the information-processing framework, has focused almost exclusively on active minorities’ advocacy about the merits of their own position and their attempts to convert others to that position. Implied in this research is the notion that minorities improve their position as they recruit others to become like they are. Recently, Moscovici and Perez (2007) pointed to a different influence strategy. They argue that minorities may seek to improve their position by inducing guilt among the members of the majority who often discriminate against them and seeking compensation for their victimization. This strategy, though efficient in securing compensatory rewards for the victimized minorities, proved inefficient in getting them accepted as equals within a group (Moscovici & Perez, 2007). Thus, it appears that minorities seeking acceptance need an influence strategy that goes beyond inducing guilt.

In this article, we address two important issues largely neglected in past research on minority influence—the implications of successful minority influence for the group dynamics and multiple ways in which minorities may attempt to influence majorities. Regarding the former, it is notable that research on minority influence has focused almost exclusively on intrapersonal rather than interpersonal or group aspects of minority influence. According to Levine and Kaarbo (2001), there are many reasons for this neglect of the implications of minority influence for the group. Although Moscovici’s work was inspired by his analysis of the power of minorities to inspire group-level, social change, his and other pioneering work on minority influence focused on processing of messages, not on social implications. Also, because the field of psychology as a whole was focused on cognitive processes, it is understandable that most of the literature at this time adopts a cognitive focus. Finally, reliance on intrapersonal dependent measures can also be explained by the many methodological difficulties associated with creating and studying groups within a laboratory setting.

Groups in the aftermath of successful minority influence

It is important to recognize that a minority’s ultimate goal is not merely to convince any one individual of their opinion, but rather to institute social change by convincing many. When they are successful at winning over a sufficient number of majority members, the resultant outcome is change within the group. Social change occurs when a previously accepted normative opinion within a group is substituted by a novel, once unpopular opinion. Far from being mechanical, such a change represents more than a switch in the majority and minority positions within a group. According to Prislin and Christensen (2005a), this change within a group also represents a change of the group.

In a series of studies, Prislin and her colleagues have demonstrated that immediately in the aftermath of social change effected by successful minority influence, the group becomes weakened. This weakening of the group is evident in the overall decrease in identification with the group. Those who lose the majority position dis-identify from the group dramatically and, very promptly, former minorities (new majorities) are slow to identify with the group that elevated them to the majority position. Thus, in the aftermath of social change, neither faction appears to accept the group as their own (Prislin & Christensen, 2005a). Compounding this detachment from the group is the apparent entrenchment in the opposing opinions, with new majorities proclaiming their opinion increasingly important and exclusively acceptable, and new minorities holding their opinion just as important and acceptable. Not surprisingly, both factions hold low expectations for positive interactions with the group (Prislin, Limbert, & Bauer, 2000). Acting on these expectations, both factions are eager to leave the group in the aftermath of social change,
additionally illustrating potentially detrimental effects of social change on the group as a whole (Prislin & Christensen, 2005b).

**Limitations of conversion as an influence strategy**

Previous research on minority influence, whether focused on the individual or the group, has examined exclusively minority attempts to convert members of the majority to their position (Crano & Prislin, 2006). Conversion occurs when a significant number of group members are persuaded to abandon their previously held position and adopt another evaluatively opposite opinion as their own. Indeed, some minorities strive to achieve just that—convert majority members to their position. History abounds with examples of political, religious, and epistemological minorities who have tried and successfully converted others to their positions. Although important, conversion, however, is not a sole goal pursued by minorities. For some minorities, converting others to their position is neither a feasible nor a desirable goal. For example, gays, ethnic minorities, and even some religious minorities are not trying to convert others to their sexual, ethnic, or religious orientation. Yet, these minorities are just as active in exerting influence albeit of a different type. Their goal is to raise tolerance for their position within a group. This reasoning echoes Quiamzade and colleagues’ (2010) observation about the limits of Moscovici’s conversion theory, which does not take into account the social context of the opinions that are being changed. Therefore, whereas conversion is often used, other methods of influence may be more successful when considering the social realm associated with debated position.

The field of political science recognizes tolerance as an important strategy by which people adjust to political, racial, and social change. According to Chong (1994), tolerance occurs when those in the majority do not change their opinion to coincide with that of the minority, but instead follow another way of thinking. Ideas that once may have been viewed as controversial become acknowledged as an acceptable way of orienting to the world. Chong allows that over time, individuals are no longer just “putting up with” these new ideas, but instead accepting them and viewing them as less threatening. Chong’s definition of tolerance coincides with Allport’s (1958) view of a tolerant person as someone who “not only endures, but in general, approves his fellow men” (p. 398).

The idea of tolerance resonates with social judgment theory and its construct of latitude of acceptance (Sherif and Hovland, 1961). When considering a certain opinion or belief that differs from one’s own, an individual typically engages in social judgments, delineating those positions that are acceptable (latitude of acceptance) from others that are found objectionable (latitude of rejection). Within this framework, tolerance occurs with expanding latitudes of acceptance that incorporate a broader spectrum of opinions, which are seen as valid and therefore acceptable.

When advocating tolerance, minorities seek to convince majorities to expand their latitudes of acceptance. Advocacy for tolerance changes the meaning of a divergent position from that of deviance to diversity (Nemeth, 1986). Thus, the goal of minorities advocating tolerance is not to replace one position, which is deemed exclusively valid and legitimate, with another, equally exclusively valid and legitimate position. Rather, their goal is to widen the scope of valid positions to include that preferred by the minority. This goal is in direct opposition to those who advocate for conversion in that the initial position of group members need not be abandoned. Instead, advocacy of tolerance suggests only that a number of opinions be accepted and encouraged as legitimate and with equal significance.

Social change effected by minorities’ successful advocacy for tolerance differs from social change effected by minorities’ successful advocacy for conversion in several important ways. In the aftermath of social change through increased tolerance, the former exclusively valid (majority) position remains incorporated in the scope of acceptable positions within the group. Thus, although losing exclusivity, the former majorities...
do not lose commonality with the group. Their position remains as one-among-the-equals within the group. At the same time, the former minorities’ position is elevated to the same status as others. Thus, in the aftermath of social change through increased tolerance, various factions within the group are afforded the same status. They equally contribute to what is newly normative within the group. This commonality of status makes each faction a constitutive element of the group and the group an acceptable social category to each faction. Thus, in the aftermath of social change via increased tolerance, differing factions within a group, including former minorities and former majorities, should accept the group as their own.

The ideals associated with tolerance are in contrast to social change effected via conversion. Whereas conversion replaces one exclusively valid position with another, it preserves the notion that positions differing from the newly established valid position are deviant (Levine, 1989). This relegates former majorities (new minorities) from the normative faction within a group to a deviant faction within the group. Consequently, they have little reason to accept the group as their own. At the same time, former minorities (new majorities), though numerically dominant within the group, have little in common with the remainder of the group. Thus, they remain detached from the group as they were while in the minority. Thus, in the aftermath of social change via conversion, neither faction accepts the group as their own.

The hypothesized differences in reactions to social change via increased tolerance as opposed to conversion received empirical support in two studies showing that minorities who increased tolerance for diversity, compared with those who converted a group to their position, identified more strongly with the group (Prislin & Filson, 2009). Additionally, expecting that differences within a group would be regulated through conciliation (vs. conflict), majorities dis-identified less from the group when they lost their dominant position due to the group’s increased tolerance for diversity than the group’s conversion to the minority position. Thus, it appears that minority-effected social change has quite different consequences for the group depending on influence strategy.

The present study seeks to extend previous research by further examining the implications of previously established differences in group identification in the aftermath of social change effected via group conversion versus increased tolerance. Because group identification is stronger in the aftermath of social change effected via group tolerance than conversion, the results suggest that the group as a whole is stronger in the former than in the latter case. This strength should be evident not only in group members’ identification but importantly, in their behavior relevant for the well-being of the group (Levine & Moreland, 2002). This behavior should be especially consequential when group members have a choice between actions that would benefit them personally and those that would benefit the group. Furthermore, this study not only serves to expand upon the findings of Prislin and Filson (2009), but also aims to provide a diagnostic measure examining what occurs when group members have the option to behave in a way which would benefit themselves or benefit the group.

**Group loyalty**

The dilemma between self-interest and group-interest tests group loyalty. According to Brewer and Silver (2000), group loyalty refers to “the willingness of group members to exert effort, pay costs, or sacrifice personal benefits on behalf of the group as a whole” (p. 162; see also Levine & Moreland, 2002). In order for group members to be loyal to the group, it is necessary that they identify with the group. As postulated by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), as members become identified with a group, their interests and goals become increasingly intertwined with those of the group. This acceptance of group interests and goals as one’s own causes group members to experience any benefit to the group as a benefit to themselves. Consequently, they are likely to engage in behaviors that facilitate and promote gains for their group. Echoing Tajfel and Turner (1986), Brewer and Silver (2000)
contend that there is a strong correlation between the strength of identification with a group and behaviors associated with group loyalty. This contention received empirical support in a study showing that highly identified individuals, compared to those lower in identification, were more likely to engage in behavior that helps the group rather than themselves, even when their contributions remain anonymous (Barreto & Ellemers, 2000). Extending these findings, Zdaniuk and Levine (2001) showed that highly identified group members, compared to those less identified, are willing to forgo personal benefits and remain with the group when it helps the group. Interestingly, this difference was not found when loyalty was operationalized as leaving the group in order to advance the group’s cause at personal expense. The willingness of high identifiers to sacrifice for the group appears to be due to their perceiving their group membership extremely positively (Van Vugt & Hart, 2004). Thus, group identification appears a necessary factor to group loyalty, providing a bond that keeps the group strong at trying times.

The present study

The present study seeks to extend previous research on social change to examine behavioral consequences of previously demonstrated differences in group identification as a result of different modes of change. Specifically, we hypothesize that behavioral indicators of group loyalty among members of successful minorities should be higher when they effect social change by advocacy for tolerance than conversion. We further hypothesize that this effect of type of influence on group loyalty should be mediated by two separate components of group identification as outlined by Tajfel (1982): group self-similarity and group valuation.

These hypotheses were examined in a study that emulated a political campaign in which minorities tried either to convert their opponents to their position or advocate for tolerance of different opinions. Minorities either succeeded in becoming the majority, or failed and remained in the minority. They reported their identification with the group and were free to leave. However, those who were successful were given the opportunity to stay and help their group by generating ideas for a seemingly separate task. Group loyalty was measured by the number of ideas the participants generated while staying to help their group.

Method

Participants and Design

Ninety-six undergraduates participated in exchange for partial fulfillment of a course requirement, 68 were women and 28 were men, mean age $M = 19.17$, $SD = 1.97$. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (stability of initial minority position: stable minority vs. changed to majority) x 2 (type of influence: conversion vs. tolerance) between-subjects design.

Procedure

In each session, one participant and five confederates engaged in a mock political campaign. Using an ostensibly random procedure, the participant was always selected to play the role of the political candidate, and the confederates played the part of voters. The experimenter explained that in “real-life campaigns, very often candidates get or lose votes because of their position on a single but important issue”. To resemble a real-life political campaign, the candidate was given the task of discussing a prominent issue to modern-day campaigns—legalization of marijuana. The candidate was asked to convey their opinion on the issue by addressing ten pertinent aspects (e.g., marijuana as a painkiller, a gateway to hard drugs, its effects on the economy, crime, etc.). In the conversion condition, the candidate was given the goal of converting the other voters to their opinion. In doing so, they were told to express their opinions on each of the ten questions regarding the legalization of marijuana. More specifically, the participant was to voice their beliefs in a way that would persuade others that their way of thinking was, in fact, correct. Conversely, with an
explanation that a basic premise of democracies is respect for differences, the candidate in the **tolerance condition** was asked to “convince voters that there is more than one way of looking at the issue and that it is to everybody’s advantage to be tolerant of different opinions on the issue”. Specifically, the candidate’s task was to convince the voters that it is best to have an open mind regarding differences in opinions, and acknowledge both the positive and negative aspects of each viewpoint with respect to the ten aforementioned areas. Additionally, the experimenters in each session kept a record detailing whether or not participants consistently sought to convert or increase the tolerance of their opponents in accordance with their instructions. In exchange for successfully convincing the majority of voters, the participants in both conditions were told that they would receive an additional credit hour towards their requirement.

For each of the ten questions regarding the legalization of marijuana, the voters expressed agreement or disagreement with the candidate both verbally and by holding up a green (agree) or red (disagree) card. It was explained that the voters’ responses provided feedback to the candidate much like the feedback provided in real political campaigns. In all sessions a minority position was established for the candidate by the agreement of only one voter. In the **stable condition**, this 2:4 ratio was maintained for all 10 rounds and the final vote. In the **change condition**, where the candidate’s initial minority position changed to a majority position, two voters switched their alignment for the sixth round through the final vote (4:2). Following the last round, the voters and the candidate cast their ballots to decide whether to “elect” the candidate by a simple majority vote. After the vote, the candidate was taken to a separate room to complete the dependent measures on a computer.

For participants in the **stable minority condition** (those who were not successful at convincing others), the study was finalized when they completed a computer questionnaire at which point they were probed for suspicion, debriefed, and thanked for their participation. Those in the **change condition** were told that they had earned their promised additional hour of credit. They were also told that they were the only participant to receive the extra credit, and were offered the chance to stay and help other group members also earn the additional credit. The experimenter explained that because others had a much easier task as voters in the first part of the experiment, they could earn an additional credit only if they generated an above average number of ideas for a creative use of a knife in what was ostensibly a test of group creativity framed as a wholly separate task. The participants who agreed to stay longer and contribute to the group were given a sheet of paper to generate ideas that “were to be counted toward the group average”. Finally, all participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed, and thanked for their participation.

**Dependent measures**

Group identification was measured by assessing its two components: group valuation and perception of group–self similarity (Tajfel, 1982).

**Group valuation** Participants indicated how much they liked the group with which they had participated and how much they would like to socialize with the group, take a class with the group, discuss other issues with the group, and work on a long-term project with the group. Their responses were averaged into an index of group attraction ($\alpha = .848$).

**Group–self similarity** Participants indicated how much the group was similar “to you” and “to people who are important to you”. Responses to the two questions were averaged into an index of group–self similarity ($\alpha = .76$). These dependent variables were assessed on a scale ranging from −4 (very much unattractive/dissimilar) to +4 (very much attractive/similar).

**Group loyalty** The total number of ideas that participants generated served as an indicator of group loyalty with 0 indicating that participants declined to work for the group (generated no ideas).
Manipulation checks  The effectiveness of the stability of minority position manipulation was assessed by questions about the extent to which others in the group agreed with the participant “at the beginning of the session” and “at the end of the session” (−4 = not at all, 4 = very much). Additionally, participants were asked about the extent to which others’ agreement varied throughout the session (−4 = very much decreased, 0 = remained the same, 4 = very much increased).

The effectiveness of the type of influence manipulation was assessed by questions about the extent to which the participant’s task was to convince others to agree with his or her position on the issue and win others’ support for his or her (dis)agreement with the issue (check of the conversion influence manipulation (α = .935), convince others that there is more than one acceptable position and that they should be tolerant of different opinions on the issue (check of the tolerance manipulation, α = .804). These questions were answered on a scale ranging from −4 (not at all) to 4 (very much).

Results

Manipulation checks

Stability of minority position  A 2 (stability of minority position: stable vs. changed to majority) x 2 (type of influence: conversion vs. tolerance) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on participants’ perception of others’ agreement at the beginning of the session did not yield significant results. As intended, participants perceived a low estimate across all conditions (M = −2.59, SD = 1.44) indicating that they were aware of their initial minority status. A subsequent analysis of awareness of position at the end of the session yielded only a significant main effect of stability of position, F(1, 95) = 451.50, p < .001, partial η² = .83. Also as intended, participants who remained in the minority position perceived significantly less agreement at the end (M = −3.04, SD = 1.01) than those whose position changed from minority to majority (M = 2.14, SD = 1.37). An additional analysis that examined the extent to which participants felt that agreement of others varied within the session revealed only a significant main effect of stability of position, F(1, 95) = 150.57, p < .001, partial η² = .61. Participants whose position remained stable throughout the session perceived little variability in others’ support (M = 0.02, SD = 0.32) whereas those whose position changed to the majority perceived an increase in others’ support (M = 1.98, SD = 1.07). In summary, participants who remained in the minority condition correctly perceived others’ agreement to be consistently low throughout the session, whereas those in the change condition correctly perceived others’ agreement to be varied and increasing during the study.

Type of influence  A 2 (stability of minority position: stable vs. changed to majority) x 2 (type of influence: conversion vs. tolerance) ANOVA assessing the degree to which the participants’ task was to convert others to their opinion yielded only a significant main effect of type of influence, F(1, 95) = 283.23, p < .001, η² = .75. Participants who were in the conversion condition correctly reported conversion of others as their goal (M = 3.01, SD = 0.85), whereas those in the tolerance condition reported this was not their goal (M = −1.60, SD = 1.73). Additionally, the degree to which participants felt their goal was to advocate for tolerance was analyzed. Only a main effect of type of position was found, F(1, 95) = 49.52, p < .001, η² = .34. Those in the tolerance condition correctly reported advocacy of tolerance as their goal (M = 2.60, SD = 1.36), where as those in the conversion condition reported this as less of their goal (M = 0.13, SD = 2.07). (All other Fs < 1.) The efficacy of the influence strategy manipulation was additionally corroborated by experimenters’ records documenting that all participants acted in accordance with the instructions.

Group valuation  A 2 (stability of minority position: stable vs. changed to majority) x 2 (type of influence: conversion vs. tolerance) ANOVA assessing group valuation yielded a significant main effect of stability of position, F(1, 95) = 22.04, p < .001, partial η² = .19. This effect,
however, was qualified by a significant Stability of position x Type of influence interaction, $F(1, 95) = 13.63, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .13$ (Table 1). This and all other significant interactions were further analyzed using Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Replicating previous findings, planned contrasts revealed that those in the tolerance condition valued the group significantly more when their initial minority position changed to majority than when it remained stable, $t(95) = 5.9, p < .001$. In contrast, among those in the conversion condition, there was no significant difference in group valuation between the stable and change conditions, $t(95) = 0.71, p = .48, ns$. Additional contrasts in the change condition revealed that participants who advocated for tolerance, opposed to those who tried to convert others, felt significantly more similar to the group, $t(95) = 2.32, p < .02$. In contrast, participants in stable minority condition felt comparably dissimilar from the group regardless of type of influence they exerted, $t(95) = 1.64, p = .10, ns$.

**Group loyalty**

Group loyalty was assessed by the number of ideas generated by the participant. Only those participants who were assigned to the change condition had the opportunity to generate ideas. A one-way (type of influence: conversion vs. tolerance) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of type of influence, $F(1, 47) = 8.37, p < .01$, partial $\eta^2 = .15$. Participants who advocated tolerance generated significantly more ideas ($M = 5.04, SD = 2.58$) than those in the conversion condition ($M = 2.36, SD = 3.82$).

**Mediational analysis**

To test out the hypothesis that the effect of type of influence on group loyalty was mediated by

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*Note: Larger numbers indicate more positive group valuation and greater group–self similarity.*
two separate components of group identification, regressions analyses were conducted as recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). In these analyses, type of influence was treated as an independent variable, number of ideas generated as a dependent variable, and group valuation and group–self similarity as mediators. Mirroring ANOVA outcomes, first regression analysis showed that the type of influence strategy was a significant predictor of group loyalty \((B = 1.341), t(47) = 2.89, p < .01\). Subsequent regressions documented that the type of influence strategy was a significant predictor of group valuation \((B = .514), t(46) = 7.04, p < .001, \text{and} B = 1.88), t(46) = 8.41, p < .001, \text{for group valuation and group–self similarity, respectively}, whereas predictive contribution of type of influence was reduced to non-significance \((B = .11), t(45) = .54, ns\). Sobel tests revealed a significant indirect effect of type of influence via group valuation \((Z = 2.44, p < .05; Z = 2.07) and group self-similarity \((Z = 2.07, p < .05)\).

In summary, results showed that individuals who were successful at raising tolerance of their group, as opposed to those who were successful converting others, were significantly more loyal to the group. As hypothesized, this effect was mediated by group identification with both evaluative and cognitive components of identification contributing significantly to the mediation.

Discussion

The results of this study provided strong support for the hypothesis about differential effects of social change on group loyalty depending on type of influence that brought about change. When a minority became a majority through successfully converting others to their side, group members showed little willingness to sacrifice their time and work on behalf of the group that elevated them to the majority status. In contrast, a minority that successfully increased tolerance for different opinions within the group agreed to invest time and energy into performing a task that benefited the group. Their sacrifice on behalf of the group is worth noting, given a short history of their interaction with other group members and a complete absence of any recognition or reciprocity for their contribution. Apparently, success at widening other group members’ minds opened the door to group loyalty.

As hypothesized, the effect of mode of social change (conversion vs. tolerance) on group loyalty was mediated by group identification. Specifically, minorities who successfully increased tolerance within the group, in comparison to minorities who successfully converted the group to their position, valued the group more and were more likely to consider themselves members of the group. In turn, this increased group valuation and group–self similarity translated into group loyalty evident in self-sacrificing behavior on behalf of the group. This can be further explained by the findings of Prislin and Filson (2009), indicating that those who were successful in converting group members to their opinion had significantly higher expectations for conflict within the group compared to those who successfully advocated for tolerance within the group. Elevated expectations for conflict within the group may result in the decreased feelings of identification with the group among those advocating for conversion. Groups, therefore, are quite different in the aftermath of social change depending on how that change is effected.

Our finding about stronger group loyalty among minorities who successfully advocated for tolerance than those who successfully converted others to their position suggests that only the former reacted differently than they would have reacted had they been unsuccessful at their influence attempts. Although we did not collect behavioral data among the unsuccessful (stable) minorities, previous research strongly suggests that the unsuccessful (stable) minorities would show little, if any loyalty to the group. This conjecture is supported by the finding that stable minorities consistently disengage from the group
in which they are rejected (Prislin & Christensen, 2005a) and are eager to leave the group (Prislin & Christensen, 2005b). Thus, we had little reason to believe that stable minorities would be willing to invest time and effort to benefit the group while expecting nothing in return. This conjecture, however, should be empirically tested in future research.

Loyalty to the group is important for group functioning at any point in time but it may become essential for group survival in the time of social change that is typically characterized by turmoil and uncertainty. Willingness of group members to work on behalf of the group, especially those who come to dominate the group in the aftermath of change, may well define the fate of the group. Our findings show that a group which has been transformed to embrace diversity is better equipped to face the challenges of change than a group that has been transformed to embrace a single, previously rejected position. This difference should be especially important for “open” groups whose members are free to change their membership status and exit the group when they desire (Ziller, 1965). To the extent that our findings generalize to different acts of loyalty, we would expect members of the groups with increased tolerance to be more likely to forgo personal advantages associated with exiting the group (Prislin & Christensen, 2005b; Van Vugt & Hart, 2004; Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001), sacrifice to divert threats to the group (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002), and share responsibly the finite resources needed by all group members (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005; Kollock, 1998). These findings further satisfy the initial goal to specifically provide a diagnostic measure of situations where individuals have the opportunity to choose to behave in a way that benefits himself or herself or benefits the group alone. These results contribute an often neglected behavioral component to the field which provides insight into how minorities, as a result of successful advocacy of tolerance, would respond in real-life settings.

Although successful advocacy for tolerance appears to be more beneficial to the group than successful conversion of opponents, these two influence strategies have different consequences for the group when attempted unsuccessfully. Of the minorities who were not successful, those who advocated for tolerance disliked the group significantly more than their unsuccessful counterparts who tried to convert others. This strong affective reaction toward the group that failed to embrace tolerance likely reflected unsuccessful minorities’ perception that they differed from the group in terms of core values rather than a single attitudinal position. Thus, rejection of the idea of tolerance may have a more symbolic meaning than refusal to convert to specific position.

Our findings show that the consequences of both successful and unsuccessful advocacy for tolerance are quite different from the consequences of (un)successful advocacy for conversion. Given these differences, it is important to understand what may motivate minorities to attempt one influence strategy over the other. Assuming that attempts to social influence are inspired by the same motives as reactions to social influence (Prislin & Wood, 2005), we surmise that a primary motive for advocacy for tolerance may be need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Minorities seeking acceptance without having to sacrifice their idiosyncratic characteristics are likely to advocate tolerance. This is likely to be the case with ethnic minorities who typically prefer multic和平 as a tolerant co-existence (Verkuyten, 2005), and sexual minorities seeking equal rights (Herek, 2006). Advocacy for tolerance, however, should be less attractive to minorities motivated to have their positions validated (Festinger, 1954). Only by converting others to their position can minorities obtain social proof that their position represents the correct understanding of reality (Higgins & Pittman, 2008). For example, only after others converted to his position was Copernicus’ once heretical theory of heliocentrism validated as the correct way of understanding the universe. In addition to validation-seeking minorities, instrumentally motivated minorities are also likely to advocate conversion. These minorities seek others’ support as a means toward achieving other goal. For example,
politicians competing for public office aim to convert opponents’ supporters in order to secure sufficient number of votes to be elected.

The advocacy of a multicultural viewpoint is the most direct example of tolerance in action. The use of tolerance is not only beneficial to the minorities who are trying to boost their status, but to the larger group as a whole. As Prislin and Filson (2009) illustrated, when such a drastic change within a group takes place, it is expected that further interactions with group members may not be peaceful. Through conversion, the potential for violence is real, whereas, with tolerance it is unlikely. For example, in countries where abortion was previously outlawed and then made legal, those in opposition have often resorted to violence. This change, however, is reflective of conversion not tolerance. If this change had taken place through the use of tolerance, those in opposition would have expanded their view of what is acceptable. This could be seen as a more “pro-choice” viewpoint where individuals are not pro-abortion, per se, but instead find it acceptable for those to choose if abortion is right for them or not.

As these examples illustrate, influence strategies, including seeking conversion and advocating tolerance, may be grounded in different motives for minority influence. Future research should test our speculations about motivational underpinnings of different influence strategies to advance our understanding of group dynamics in the aftermath of social change.

References


**Biographical notes**

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