

Seeking Conversion Versus Advocating Tolerance in the Pursuit of Social Change

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In 2 studies, the authors examined reactions to social change effected by minorities' successful increase of tolerance for diversity within a group or conversion of a group to the minority position. Minorities who increased tolerance for diversity, compared with those who converted a group to their own position, identified more strongly with the group (Study 1). Study 2 replicated these findings. Additionally, it showed that majorities disidentified less from the group when majorities lost their dominant position due to the group's increased tolerance for diversity than when majorities lost their dominant position due to the group's conversion to the minority position. Thus, minority-effected social change left a group stronger when that change increased the group's tolerance than when the group experienced conversion. Expectations that differences within a group would be regulated through social conflict (vs. conciliation) mediated the effect of the mode of change on group identification. Motives for minorities' pursuit of social change through tolerance of diversity versus group conversion are discussed.

Keywords: minority influence, social change, conversion, tolerance

The victory of the Democratic party in the United States' 2006 congressional elections, the 2007 U. S. Supreme Court's ban of partial-birth abortion, and the widespread concern about global warming are recent examples of social change effected by a successful minority. Social change or alteration of social structure within a group almost invariably comes from minority influence. It was this observation about the origins of social change that inspired Moscovici's (1976; Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972) seminal work on minority influence. The subsequent thriving research has uncovered many conditions necessary for a minority to prevail and processes underlying minority success (for recent reviews, see Butera & Levine, in press; Hewstone & Martin, in press). Although theoretical accounts of minority influence differ, most share the idea that change in response to minority influence is gradual. According to Moscovici's (1980, 1985) conversion theory, the distinctiveness of a minority position inspires majority group members to examine the minority position closely in order to understand minority advocacy. This thorough examination of the minority position may cause change if the position is substantiated by cogent arguments. Yet, potentially negative social implications of siding with the minority often preclude public acceptance of the minority position. A more likely reaction is private change on issues that are conceptually related, rather than focal, to minority advocacy. If this minority-inspired conversion is substantial, consistency pressures that build over time may cause direct

change on the focal issue (Crano & Chen, 1998) and, eventually, public acceptance of the minority position (Moscovici, 1985).

This theorizing and much of contemporary research on minority influence is focused on the persuasive effects of minorities on individual targets (Crano & Prislin, 2006). Although research has provided many profound insights into processing and acceptance of minority advocacy, research has largely neglected social implications of minority influence. This is unfortunate, given that effecting change at the individual level is rarely a minority's ultimate goal. Rather, it is an intermediary step toward the ultimate goal of social change or of altering social structure within the group (Harper, 1998). It is important to note that minorities may instigate social change in a number of ways. Yet, current theorizing does not account for a diversity of minority advocacy. Contrary to the prevailing (implicit) assumption that all active minorities aim to convert others to their position, some minorities may seek tolerance for a variety of positions. This advocacy for tolerance has not been examined in minority influence research. Our goal is to address these neglected aspects of minority influence by comparing the social implications of a minority's advocacy for tolerance with a minority's quest for conversion. We intend to demonstrate that for a group undergoing change, it is consequential what agents of change advocate (tolerance vs. conversion), not only who the advocates are (minority vs. majority). We hypothesize that a minority's successful advocacy for tolerance, in comparison with a minority's successful quest for conversion, decreases the expected regulation of intragroup differences through social conflict and, ultimately, leads to stronger identification with the group.

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Seeking Conversion: Change Through Reversal of Positions

As our opening examples illustrate, minorities may create social change by convincing a sufficient number of group members to

reverse their preference between two opposing political parties, attitudinal positions, or world views. This form of change represents a group conversion, in that the group reverses its position on the issue of minority advocacy. In doing so, it transforms the initial minority into a majority and vice versa. It is important to note that this form of social change preserves the notion of only one acceptable position within the group. This narrow definition that favors a majority renders other positions deviant (Levine, 1989). Thus, in the aftermath of social change, a new minority (former majority) is rendered deviant, just as a new majority (successful former minority) was deviant before social change. In the spirit of the view that "those who are not with us are against us," conversion retains the idea of exclusion of differences. Worse yet, it may strengthen exclusion. This possibility is suggested by the finding that former minorities who effected change via group conversion widened the scope of differences they find unacceptable. Specifically, upon successfully converting the majority of group members to their position, former minorities found even some of the positions that they did not object to before the change to be unacceptable (Prislin, Limbert, & Bauer, 2000).

This widening of the enemy territory has important social consequences. Positions deemed unacceptable are likely to be contested and regulated through social conflict (Levine, 1989; Moscovici, 1976; Mugny, 1982). Thus, social change via conversion should perpetuate social conflict within a group, making its factions entrenched in their respective positions. Some evidence in support of this hypothesis comes from previous research showing that social change via group conversion increases expectations for hostilities within a group (Prislin et al., 2000, Study 2). Moreover, group factions contesting each others' differences find too little common ground to identify with the group as a shared category. Change comes at a price for the group, as neither of its factions, including a newly dominant majority (successful minority), takes ownership of the group (for review, see Prislin & Christensen, 2005a).

Beyond Conversion: Change Through Increased Tolerance

As social history illustrates, minorities often seek conversion. Yet, minorities' influence agenda goes beyond group conversion. For some minorities, convincing others to adopt their position is neither a desirable nor a feasible goal. Sexual, ethnic, and some religious minorities do not proselytize. Still, they seek to influence others. Many are hard at work trying to convince others to accept them without subscribing to their way of life. At a general level, these minorities advocate tolerance for diversity as a way of improving their own position within a group. Their goal is to change what a group defines as acceptable within its boundaries.

A narrow definition that reduces what is acceptable within a group to a single position renders other positions deviant (Levine, 1989). Minorities advocating tolerance aim to expand the scope of acceptable positions. They explicitly advocate divergent thought about differences within a group (Nemeth, 1986), recasting differences as diversity rather than deviance. It is important to note that successful minorities do not change their targets' preferred positions. Rather, they expand their targets' latitudes of acceptance (Sherif & Hovland, 1961), making them more inclusive. In doing so, they broaden the standard of acceptability within a group. This more inclusive group standard *ipso facto* transforms the minority

position from deviant and therefore unacceptable to diverse and therefore acceptable (Chong, 1994).¹

Social change via increased tolerance has important social implications. It transforms a group from a category that favors some of its constitutive elements (factions) but rejects others into a category whose constitutive elements (factions) are equally valued. Within the tolerance framework, therefore, the group changes the meaning of differences. If so, then group factions should also change how they regulate their differences. Rather than trying to make their specific difference normative, causing a conflict with others, factions should regulate differences through mutual accommodation and respect. This communality should ensure that the group is an acceptable social category to all its constitutive elements (factions).

Some suggestive evidence in support of this reasoning comes from research on group mergers. This research demonstrated that commitment to the merged organization was higher when the merger pattern preserved the features of premerger groups than when it imposed the features of the acquiring group on all others. It is important to note that the effect of merger integration patterns on organizational commitment was mediated by employees' expectation about how formerly separate groups would interact within the merged organization. When the merger pattern ensured respect for all premerger groups, the employees developed favorable expectations regarding their mutual contacts and, consequently, showed a high level commitment to the merged organization (Mottola, Bachman, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1997).

In summary, the presumed differences between social change via group conversion and social change via increased tolerance should result in different reactions to the group in which such change occurs. Specifically, in comparison with their counterparts who are unsuccessful at effecting social change, (a) minorities successful at raising tolerance should increase their expectations for conciliatory (v. confrontational) regulation of differences within the group and show resultant stronger identification with the group, whereas (b) minorities successful at converting the group to their position should show no significant change in either their expectations for confrontational (vs. conciliatory) regulation of differences or their identification. This further implies that (c) minorities successful at raising tolerance, in comparison with those successful at converting the group to their position, should show stronger expectations for conciliatory (vs. confrontational) regulation of differences and resultant stronger identification with the group.

¹ Minorities advocating tolerance may resemble minorities with a flexible behavioral style (Mugny, 1982), in that both accept different positions within a group. The crucial difference is in their ultimate goal. Minorities advocating tolerance accept differences as the value in and of itself. By contrast, flexible minorities accept differences as a means toward their ultimate goal of converting others to their position. Thus, social change sought by these two types of minorities is quite different—the former seek to transform the group into an overall more tolerant category. To the extent that they are successful, they should feel accepted within the group and should therefore have little reason to seek group conversion to their own position. By contrast, flexible minorities seek group conversion and use tolerance as a negotiation tool to recruit others to their position (Mugny, 1982).

These hypotheses were examined in two studies in which minorities who sought to convert the group to their position or to increase the group's tolerance for diversity either succeeded and therefore transformed into majorities or failed and therefore remained in the minority. In Study 1, participants, in the context of a mock political campaign, tried to win others' support for their preferred position on an issue or tolerance for different positions on the issue. The participant was initially placed in a minority position by virtue of receiving support from one confederate while being opposed by the remaining four. This initial minority position either remained stable throughout the interaction or reversed to the majority position when two confederates switched from opposing to supporting the participant. At the end of the campaign, participants reported their identification with the group. Study 2 replicated Study 1 and documented the hypothesized meditational process with an examination of participants' expectations for social conflict regulation. Moreover, Study 2 extended this examination to majority group members who successfully (or unsuccessfully) sought conversion, versus tolerance. As elaborated subsequently, their reactions were expected to differ from those of their minority counterparts.

Study 1

Method

Participants and Design

Of the 96 undergraduates who participated in exchange for partial fulfillment of a course requirement, 68 were women and 28 were men, with a mean age of $M = 19.17$ years, $SD = 1.97$. The sample included 59 White (non-Latino, non-Latina) Americans, 20 Latino and Latina Americans, 8 Asian Americans, 2 African Americans, and 7 participants of another race and/or ethnicity. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (stability of initial minority position: stable vs. changed to majority) \times 2 (type of influence: conversion vs. tolerance) between-subjects design.

Procedure

In each session, 1 participant and five confederates² engaged in a mock political campaign. Through an ostensibly random procedure, the participant was always selected to play the role of the political candidate, and the confederates took the part of voters. The experimenter explained that in "real life campaigns, very often candidates get or lose votes because of their position on a single but important issue." To resemble real-life campaigns, the candidate's task was to discuss just such an issue—mandatory higher fuel-efficiency standards for cars manufactured and sold in the United States. In preparation for the campaign, the candidate was given a list of 10 discussion topics: choices of cars, choices of transportation modes, oil resources, dependence on foreign oil, gasoline prices, car prices, pollution, effects on the American automobile industry, effects on American business in general, and effects on the American way of life. The candidate was asked to jot down his or her ideas about each of the discussion topics in order to prepare arguments for the campaign. In the conversion condition, the candidate was asked to jot down the rationale for agreeing (or disagreeing) with mandatory higher fuel-efficiency standards

by addressing each of the 10 discussion topics (e.g., possible positive [or negative] effects of mandatory higher fuel efficiency standards for cars on American business; standards' likely advancement [or obstruction] of the American way of life). With the use of his or her sketched arguments as a reminder, the candidate was next invited to discuss each topic in order to convince the voters to take his or her position on the issue. That is, the candidate explained his or her own beliefs about each of the 10 topics in an attempt to win the voters' support for the advocated position on the issue. The voters were instructed that although they may have their own position on the issue, they should defer their final decision until they hear the candidate's arguments.

With an explanation that a basic premise of democracies is respect for differences, the candidate in the tolerance condition was given a different task. Regardless of his or her position on the issue, the candidate was asked first, to jot down the rationale for being tolerant on the issue by addressing the complexity of the 10 discussion topics (e.g., possible positive and negative effects of higher fuel-efficiency standards on American business; aspects of the American way of life that would be advanced and those that would be obstructed by these standards). With the use of his or her sketched arguments as a reminder, the candidate was next invited to discuss each topic in order to convince the voters to be open to multiple viewpoints on the issue. Specifically, the candidate was asked to "convince voters that there is more than one way of looking at the issue and that it is to everybody's advantage to be tolerant of different opinions on the issue." The voters were instructed that although they may think that there was only one right position on the issue, they should defer their final decision until they hear the candidate's arguments. Candidates in both tolerance and conversion conditions expected to receive an additional credit hour if successful at winning the support of the majority of voters.

Each time the candidate addressed a discussion topic, the voters communicated their agreement or disagreement both verbally and by holding up a green (agree) or red (disagree) card. The experimenter explained that the voters' responses provided feedback to the candidate much like the feedback provided in real political campaigns. Following the last round, the voters and the candidate cast their ballots to decide whether to elect the candidate by a simple majority vote. To establish a minority position for the candidate, one voter initially agreed with him or her and four voters disagreed. In the stable conditions, this 2:4 ratio was maintained for all 10 rounds and the final vote. In the change conditions, in which the candidate's initial minority position changed to a majority position, two voters switched their alignment for the 6th round through the final vote (4:2). After the vote, the candidate was taken to a separate room to complete the dependent measures on a computer.

Dependent Measures

On a scale ranging from -4 to 4 , participants indicated how much they liked the group with which they had participated and

² A total of 17 confederates (12 female, 5 male) participated across the experimental sessions. Confederates were assigned to participate in experimental sessions based on their class schedules, which resulted in all confederates participating in all conditions.

how much they would like to socialize, take a class, discuss other issues, and work on a long-term project with the group, as well as the extent to which they perceived the group as similar to themselves and to people who were important to them. Their responses were averaged to create an index of group identification ($\alpha = .89$).

Manipulation Checks

The effectiveness of the stability of minority position manipulation was assessed with questions about the extent to which others in the group agreed with the participant "at the beginning of the session" and "at the end of the session" ($-4 = \text{not at all}$, $4 = \text{very much}$). Additionally, participants were asked about the extent to which others' agreement varied throughout the session ($-4 = \text{very much decreased}$, $0 = \text{remained the same}$, $4 = \text{very much increased}$).

The effectiveness of the type of influence manipulation was assessed with questions about the extent to which the participant's task was to convince others to agree with his or her position on the issue and win others' support for his or her agreement (or disagreement) with the issue (check of the conversion influence manipulation, $\alpha = .93$) or to convince others that there is more than one acceptable position and that they should be tolerant of different opinions on the issue (check of the tolerance manipulation, $\alpha = .82$). Additionally, the experimenter in each session kept a record of whether the participant consistently sought support for his or her agreement (or disagreement) with the issue or for tolerance of different positions on the issue.

Results

All analyses were initially performed by including sex and race (White vs. non-White) as additional independent variables. Neither sex nor race had a significant main or interactive effect on any of the outcome variables in this study or in Study 2. Thus, these variables will not be discussed further.

Manipulation Checks

Stability of minority position. A 2 (stability of minority position: stable vs. changed to majority) \times 2 (type of influence: conversion vs. tolerance) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on participants' estimates of others' agreement at the beginning of the session did not yield significant effects ($F_s < 1.12$, ns). An overall low estimate of support ($M = -2.33$, $SD = 1.72$) indicates that participants in all conditions correctly perceived that they initially held a minority position in the group. A parallel analysis on estimates of agreement at the end of the session yielded only a significant main effect of stability of the minority position, $F(1, 92) = 242.82$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .73$. Participants whose minority position remained stable perceived less support at the end of the session ($M = -2.83$, $SD = 1.45$) than did those whose position changed from minority to majority ($M = 2.06$, $SD = 1.60$). An additional analysis on estimates of the extent to which others' support varied during the session revealed only a significant main effect of stability of the minority position, $F(1, 92) = 250.39$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .73$. As expected, participants whose minority position remained stable perceived less variability in others' support ($M = 0$, $SD = 0.50$) than did those whose

position changed from minority to majority ($M = 2.42$, $SD = 0.94$). In summary, results indicated that participants in the stable minority condition correctly perceived that they received a consistently low level of support, whereas those whose position changed to majority correctly perceived that they received an increasing level of support.

Type of influence. The effectiveness of the type of influence manipulation was tested by conducting a 2 (stability of minority position: stable vs. changed) \times 2 (type of influence: conversion vs. tolerance) \times 2 (perception of task: winning others to one's position vs. increasing acceptance of different positions) mixed model ANOVA, with perception of task as a within-subject factor. As expected, the analysis yielded a significant Type of Influence \times Task Perception interaction, $F(1, 92) = 149.71$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .62$. This interaction was decomposed by conducting separate ANOVAs within each level of the task perception variable. An ANOVA on participants' perception of their task as winning others to one's position on the issue yielded a significant effect of type of influence, $F(1, 92) = 135.19$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .60$. Perception of the task as winning others to one's position was significantly stronger in the conversion condition ($M = 2.91$, $SD = 0.85$) than in the tolerance condition ($M = -0.88$, $SD = 2.07$). Similarly, an ANOVA on participants' perception of their task as increasing acceptance of different positions yielded a significant effect of type of influence, $F(1, 92) = 40.30$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .31$. Perception of the task as increasing acceptance of different positions was significantly stronger in the tolerance condition ($M = 2.70$, $SD = 1.33$) than in the conversion condition ($M = 0.31$, $SD = 2.20$). No other effect on this manipulation variable was significant. In summary, then, results indicated that the task was perceived as intended, winning others to one's position in the conversion condition and increasing acceptance of difference positions in the tolerance condition. Experimenter's records of participants' advocacy corroborated that the participants acted in line with their perception of the task.

Group Identification

Group identification was significantly affected by stability of the minority position, $F(1, 92) = 39.99$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .30$. This effect, however, was qualified by a Stability \times Type of Influence interaction, $F(1, 92) = 19.08$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .17$ (Table 1). This and all other significant interactions were further analyzed with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. To

Table 1
Group Identification as a Function of Type of Influence and Stability of Minority Position (Study 1)

| Measure | Conversion | | Tolerance | |
|-----------|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| | Stable minority | Minority turned majority | Stable minority | Minority turned majority |
| <i>n</i> | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 |
| <i>M</i> | -1.49 _a | -0.99 _a | -2.65 _b | 0.21 _c |
| <i>SD</i> | 1.33 | 1.24 | 1.13 | 1.51 |

Note. Higher numbers indicate stronger identification with a group. Means with different subscripts are statistically different at $p < .05$.

examine the hypotheses that minorities successful at raising tolerance should increase their identification with the group, whereas those successful at converting the group to their position should show no significant increase in group identification, we compared changed and stable minorities within each of the influence conditions. In support of the hypotheses, these planned contrasts revealed a significantly higher identification with the group among changed minorities than among stable minorities in the tolerance condition, $t(92) = 7.55, p < .01$, but not in the conversion condition, $t(92) = 1.37, ns$. Additional contrasts within the change conditions provided support for the hypothesis that there would be significantly higher identification with the group among changed minorities in the tolerance condition than among those in the conversion condition, $t(92) = 4.49, p < .01$. Finally, contrasts within the stable conditions revealed significantly lower identification with the group among stable minorities who were in the tolerance condition rather than in the conversion condition, $t(92) = 3.06, p < .01$.

In summary, the results supported the hypothesis that minorities successful at raising tolerance within a group, but not those successful at converting group members to their position, would significantly increase their identification with the group. The results also supported the hypothesis that minorities successful at raising tolerance would be significantly more identified with the group than would minorities successful at converting group members to their position. Unexpectedly, the results revealed that minorities who failed to raise tolerance, in comparison with those who failed to convert others to their position, were significantly less identified with the group.

Discussion

Study 1 revealed that successful minorities reacted differently to the change in their position depending on the type of influence they exerted. In support of the hypothesis that there would be more positive reactions among minorities who successfully advocated for the tolerance of diversity rather than for conversion to their position, the results revealed that only the former significantly increased their identification with the group. That is, in comparison with their unsuccessful counterparts, only minorities successful at raising tolerance for diversity within a group significantly increased their identification with the group. Minorities who sought to convert others to their position remained as detached from the group as their unsuccessful counterparts. Clearly, becoming numerically dominant within a group did not suffice to improve their reactions toward the group.

Unexpectedly, the results also revealed differential reactions among minorities who failed in their advocacy for tolerance versus conversion. Those who failed to raise tolerance for diversity rejected the group more strongly than did minorities who failed to convert others to their position. Apparently, remaining numerically inferior within a group had a different meaning depending on whether the group rejected minorities' request for tolerance or rejected their quest for dominance. Because this finding was not anticipated, it was further probed in Study 2. In addition to replicating Study 1, Study 2 aimed to document that the observed effect of change in minority position on group identification was mediated by expectations for regulation of differences within the group. Study 2 also extended Study 1 by examining reactions of major-

ities who successfully (or unsuccessfully) advocated for tolerance versus conversion.

Study 2

Conversion and tolerance may be advocated not only by a minority but also by a majority. Successful majorities advocating conversion receive wide support for their advocacy of a single, most-preferred position on the issue under consideration. Successful majorities advocating tolerance receive wide support for their advocacy of a principle of tolerance. As long as they enjoy wide support, both majorities should have high expectations for conciliatory regulation of differences, resulting in high identification with the group. When they lose their support, however, both should find themselves a minority within a group that sanctions differences as deviance. For majorities who lose support for their advocacy of conversion, this approach to differences is nothing new. What is novel, however, is that they are now defined as deviant. Being newly defined as deviant, they should increase their expectations for confrontational (vs. conciliatory) regulation of differences and, consequently, decrease their identification with the group. For majorities who lose support for their advocacy of tolerance, the group changes from one defined by diversity to a one defined by uniformity. Becoming a minority within such a group should necessarily increase expectations for confrontational (vs. conciliatory) regulation of differences, which in turn, should decrease identification the group. We hypothesize, therefore, that losing majorities should have similarly negative reactions to a change in their position, regardless of the type of influence they attempt to exert. This should stand in contrast to rising minorities whose positive reactions should be more intense when they advocate tolerance rather than conversion.

These hypotheses were examined in a study in which either a minority or a majority successfully or unsuccessfully advocated tolerance of, versus conversion to, their position. Inherent in this design is the idea that for losing majorities, social change means transformation to a rejected minority (either because a group rejects tolerance or reverses itself on the most preferred position). This, however, need not be the case. As we discussed earlier, social change also occurs when a group replaces its wide support for a single position with an increased tolerance for a diversity of positions. For a majority whose position was previously recognized as the most preferred within a group, this type of social change means transformation to a minority whose position is recognized as one of the many equally valued within the group. Though no longer dominant, this new minority is fully integrated within the group as one among equals. To examine how this new, integrated minority reacts to social change, an additional condition was added to the original design, which manipulated initial position (minority vs. majority) and stability of initial position (stable vs. changed). In this added condition, a majority advocating conversion saw a rise of a minority advocating tolerance. As a result, this initial majority was transformed to a new, integrated minority. We compared reactions of this new integrated minority to reactions of a rejected new minority whose once dominant position within a group was replaced by a different dominant position (i.e., changed majority in the conversion condition). We anticipated that in the aftermath of social change, the reactions of an integrated new minority would be less negative than the reactions of a

rejected new minority. Integrated new minorities' negative reactions to loss of dominance should be alleviated by realization that their preferred position, though not dominant any more, will not be contested as unacceptable. Thus, integrated new minorities, in comparison with the rejected new minorities, should show stronger expectations for conciliatory (vs. confrontational) regulation of differences and resultant stronger identification with the group.

Our hypotheses were examined in a study whose procedure was similar to that used in Study 1. Specifically, participants, in the context of a mock political campaign, tried to win others' support for either their specific preferred position on an issue or tolerance for different positions on the issue. The participant was initially placed in a minority (or majority) position by virtue of receiving support from one (or three) confederate (or confederates) while being opposed by the remaining four (or two). This initial minority (or majority) position either remained stable throughout the interaction or was reversed to the majority (or minority) position when two confederates switched from opposing (or supporting) to supporting (or opposing) the participant. Participants in the integrated new minority condition lost support for their specific position as exclusively acceptable but received assurance that their position remained one-among-equals within a group. At the end of the campaign, participants reported their expectations for regulation of differences within the group and their identification with the group.

Method

Participants and Design

Of the 154 undergraduates who participated in exchange for partial fulfillment of a course requirement, 96 were women and 58 were men, with an average age of $M = 18.69$ years, $SD = 0.98$. The sample included 105 White (non-Latino, non-Latina) Americans, 15 Latino and Latina Americans, 14 Asian Americans, 10 African Americans, and 10 participants of another race and/or ethnicity. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (initial position: minority vs. majority) \times 2 (stability of initial position: stable vs. changed) \times 2 (type of influence: conversion vs. tolerance) between-subjects design and the integrated former majority condition (see above).

Procedure

The procedure was similar to that used in Study 1, with the addition of new experimental conditions and the use of a different discussion issue—legalization of marijuana. Specifically, in each session, 1 participant and five confederates engaged in a mock political campaign. The participant, acting as the political candidate, sought support from the confederates who took the part of voters. As in Study 1, the candidate sought to convince the voters to take his or her position on the issue (conversion) or to be tolerant of different positions on the issue (tolerance). To establish a minority (or majority) position for the candidate, one (or three) voter (or voters) initially agreed with him or her, and four (or two) voters disagreed. In the stable conditions, this 2:4 (or 4:2) ratio was maintained for all 10 rounds and the final vote. In the change conditions, in which the candidate's initial minority (or majority) position changed to a majority (or minority) position, two voters

switched their alignment for the 6th round through the final vote, the ratio becoming 4:2 (or 2:4).

The integrated new minority condition was operationalized in the following manner: As the participant advocated his or her preferred position on the issue, three of the five confederates agreed and two disagreed. The two disagreeing confederates commented that the candidate's position was "one way of looking at the issue but there are others that are just as right" and that the candidate "has a point but so do others who think differently." They varied these comments throughout the campaign prefacing them with "as I said," and "again" (e.g., "As I said, it's a good point but we are better off to consider different viewpoints."). Starting on the sixth round through the final vote, two of the confederates who initially agreed with the participant switched their position, commenting, "Come to think about it, we are better off to consider all viewpoints," or "It's a good point but as these guys said (pointing to initially disagreeing confederates), there is more than one way of looking at this issue."

Dependent Measures

Dependent measures, assessed on a scale ranging from -4 to 4 , were taken in the following order.

Social conflict (vs. conciliation) expectations. Participants indicated the extent to which they expected that people in their session who expressed different opinions on the legalization of marijuana would, in the future, fight each other, obstruct each other, treat each other with mutual respect, and work out their differences constructively. After recoding answers to the latter two questions, responses were averaged into an index of social conflict expectations ($\alpha = .81$).

Group identification. Group identification was measured as in Study 1.

Manipulation Checks

The effectiveness of manipulations was assessed as in Study 1.

Results

Manipulation Checks

Initial position. A 2 (initial position: minority vs. majority) \times 2 (stability of minority position: stable vs. changed) \times 2 (type of influence: conversion vs. tolerance) ANOVA on participants' estimates of others' agreement at the beginning of the session yielded a significant main effect of initial position, $F(1, 129) = 1,403.03$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .93$. As intended, participants initially in the majority ($M = 2.84$, $SD = 0.93$) perceived that others agreed with them significantly more than did participants initially in the minority ($M = -3.59$, $SD = 0.93$). No other effects were statistically significant.

Stability of initial position. A significant Initial Position \times Change interaction on the estimates of agreement with the participant at the end of the session, $F(1, 129) = 1,135.03$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .90$, indicated that the manipulation of change in the initial position was effective. Simple effects tests within the majority conditions revealed significantly higher estimates of agreements among participants in the stable condition ($M = 2.76$, $SD = 0.78$) than among participants in the changed condition ($M =$

-3.15 , $SD = 1.17$), $t(129) = 23.01$, $p < .001$. Conversely, within the minority conditions, estimates of the agreement were significantly higher among participants in the change condition ($M = 3.03$, $SD = 0.77$) than among participants in the stable condition ($M = -3.22$, $SD = 1.27$), $t(129) = 24.67$, $p < .001$. An analysis on estimates of the extent to which others' support changed yielded a significant main effect of initial position, $F(1, 129) = 408.88$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .76$, which was qualified by an Initial Position \times Change interaction, $F(1, 129) = 499.70$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .80$. Planned contrasts revealed that in comparison with stable majorities ($M = 0.14$, $SD = 0.43$), those whose position changed to the minority estimated that their support decreased significantly ($M = -2.45$, $SD = 0.90$), $t(129) = 15.27$, $p < .001$. Conversely, in comparison with stable minorities ($M = -0.11$, $SD = 0.32$), those whose position changed to the majority estimated that their support increased significantly ($M = 2.61$, $SD = 0.93$), $t(129) = 16.03$, $p < .001$. These findings indicate that as intended, participants whose position changed away from the majority perceived that they lost support, and those whose position changed toward the majority perceived that they gained support for their advocacy. No other effects on this manipulation check variable were statistically significant.

Type of influence. The effectiveness of the type of influence manipulation was tested by conducting a 2 (initial position: minority vs. majority) \times 2 (stability of initial position: stable vs. changed) \times 2 (type of influence: conversion vs. tolerance) \times 2 (perception of task: winning others to one's position vs. increasing acceptance of different positions) mixed model ANOVA, with perception of task as a within-subject factor. As expected, the analysis yielded a significant Type of Influence \times Task Perception interaction, $F(1, 129) = 819.46$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .86$. This interaction was decomposed by conducting separate ANOVAs within each level of the task perception variable. An ANOVA on participants' perception of their task as winning others to one's position on the issue yielded a significant effect of type of influence, $F(1, 129) = 622.79$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .83$. Perception of the task as winning others to one's position was significantly stronger in the conversion condition ($M = 2.75$, $SD = 0.97$) than

in the tolerance condition ($M = -1.21$, $SD = 0.87$). Similarly, an ANOVA on participants' perception of their task as increasing acceptance of different positions yielded a significant effect of type of influence, $F(1, 129) = 292.40$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .70$. Perception of the task as increasing acceptance of different positions was significantly stronger in the tolerance condition ($M = 2.83$, $SD = 0.98$) than in the conversion condition ($M = -0.66$, $SD = 1.38$). No other effect on this manipulation variable was significant. In summary, then, results indicated that the task was perceived as intended: Those who were directed to convert others saw the task as conversion, whereas those who were directed to advocate for tolerance saw the task as advocating tolerance. The experimenters' records of participants' advocacy corroborated that the participants acted in line with their perception of the task.

Group Identification

An ANOVA yielded significant main effects of initial position, $F(1, 129) = 90.32$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .41$, stability of the initial position, $F(1, 129) = 39.64$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .24$, an Initial Position \times Stability interaction, $F(1, 129) = 295.14$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .69$, and a Type of Influence \times Stability interaction, $F(1, 129) = 9.50$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .07$. These effects, however, were qualified by an Initial Position \times Stability \times Type of Influence interaction, $F(1, 129) = 28.60$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .18$ (Table 2). This interaction was decomposed by performing a two-way ANOVA within each level of the initial position variable.

An ANOVA within the initial minority conditions revealed a significant main effect of stability, $F(1, 65) = 47.45$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .42$. This effect was qualified by a Type of Influence \times Stability interaction, $F(1, 65) = 28.46$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .31$. To examine the hypotheses that minorities successful at raising tolerance should increase their identification with the group, whereas those successful at converting the group to their position should show no significant increase in group identification, the interaction effect was further analyzed by comparing changed and stable minorities within each of the influence conditions. As hypothesized, planned contrasts revealed a significantly higher level of

Table 2
Group Identification and Social Conflict Expectations as a Function of Type of Influence, Initial Position, and Stability of Initial Position (Study 2)

| Measure | Conversion | | | | Tolerance | | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| | Initial minority | | Initial majority | | Initial minority | | Initial majority | |
| | Stable minority | Minority turned majority | Stable majority | Majority turned minority | Stable minority | Minority turned majority | Stable majority | Majority turned minority |
| <i>n</i> | 18 | 16 | 18 | 16 | 18 | 17 | 17 | 17 |
| Group identification | | | | | | | | |
| <i>M</i> | -1.62 ^a | -0.87 ^a | 2.32 ^a | -1.03 ^b | -2.37 ^c | 0.67 ^c | 2.46 ^d | -1.60 ^c |
| <i>SD</i> | 1.14 | 1.04 | 0.85 | 0.91 | 0.99 | 0.94 | 0.70 | 0.70 |
| Social conflict expectations | | | | | | | | |
| <i>M</i> | 1.44 ^a | 1.50 ^a | -1.89 ^b | 1.44 ^b | 2.67 ^b | -0.23 ^c | -2.29 ^c | 1.29 ^f |
| <i>SD</i> | 1.50 | 1.90 | 1.28 | 1.28 | 1.37 | 1.40 | 0.85 | 1.31 |

Note. Higher numbers indicate stronger identification with a group and lower social conflict expectations. Means with different superscripts are statistically different ($p < .05$) within the initial minority or initial majority conditions. Means with different subscripts are statistically different ($p < .05$) within the conversion or tolerance conditions.

identification with the group among the changed minorities than among stable minorities in the tolerance condition, $t(129) = 9.75$, $p < .001$, but not in the conversion condition, $t(129) = 1.24$, *ns*. To examine the hypothesis about higher group identification among minorities who successfully advocated for tolerance rather than conversion, an additional contrast was performed within the change conditions. It revealed the anticipated, significantly higher level of identification with the group among changed minorities in the tolerance condition rather than in conversion condition, $t(129) = 4.97$, $p < .001$. Further replicating Study 1 findings, a contrast within the stable conditions revealed a significantly lower level of identification with the group among stable minorities in the tolerance condition rather than in conversion condition, $t(129) = 3.61$, $p < .001$ (Table 2).

An ANOVA within the initial majority conditions revealed a significant main effect of stability, $F(1, 64) = 370.32$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .86$. As anticipated, there was a significantly higher level of identification with the group among stable majorities ($M = 2.39$) than among changed majorities ($M = -1.32$). No other effect was statistically significant (Table 2).

We also performed simple effect tests within the conversion conditions and the tolerance conditions. Significant mean comparisons resulting from these analyses are depicted by the subscripts in Table 2.

In summary, the results replicated Study 1 findings that minorities successful at raising tolerance within a group, but not those successful at converting group members to their position, significantly increased their identification with the group. Also, minorities successful at raising tolerance were significantly more identified with the group than were minorities successful at converting group members to their position, but the reverse was found for unsuccessful (stable) minorities. Extending Study 1 findings, the results revealed the anticipated higher identification with the group among stable majorities than among changed majorities, irrespective of type of influence they exerted.

Social Conflict (vs. Conciliation) Expectations

An ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of initial position, $F(1, 129) = 52.15$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .29$, ($M_s = -0.41$ and 1.36 , for initial majority position and minority position, respectively), a stability of the initial position, $F(1, 129) = 18.52$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .13$, ($M_s = 0.01$ and 0.98 , for stable position and changed position, respectively), an Initial Position \times Stability interaction, $F(1, 129) = 106.61$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .45$, and an Initial Position \times Type of Influence interaction, $F(1, 129) = 8.13$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .06$. These effects, however, were qualified by an Initial Position \times Stability \times Type of Influence interaction, $F(1, 129) = 11.60$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .08$ (Table 2). This interaction was decomposed by performing a two-way ANOVA within each level of the type of influence variable.

An ANOVA within the initial minority conditions revealed a significant main effect of stability of the initial position, $F(1, 65) = 14.57$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .18$. This effect was qualified by a Type of Influence \times Stability interaction, $F(1, 65) = 15.73$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .19$. To examine the hypothesis that social conflict expectations would decrease among successful minorities advocating tolerance but not conversion, this interaction was further analyzed by our comparing social conflict expectations in stable

and changed minorities within each of the type of influence conditions. As anticipated, planned contrasts revealed that social conflict expectations were significantly lower among changed minorities than among stable minorities in the tolerance condition, $t(129) = 5.64$, $p < .001$, but not in the conversion condition, $t(129) = 0.11$, *ns*. In support of the hypothesis that social conflict expectations would be lower among minorities successfully advocating for tolerance rather than for conversion, an additional planned contrast revealed significantly lower expectations for social conflict among changed minorities in the tolerance condition rather than in conversion condition $t(129) = 3.27$, $p < .001$. Finally, a planned contrast within the stable conditions revealed significantly higher expectations for social conflict among stable minorities in the tolerance condition rather than in conversion conditions, $t(129) = 2.39$, $p < .02$ (Table 2).

An ANOVA within the initial majority conditions revealed a significant main effect of stability, $F(1, 64) = 143.02$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .69$. Supporting the hypothesis that majorities react similarly and negatively to change in their position, this effect indicated significantly higher expectations for social conflict among changed minorities ($M = 1.36$) than among stable majorities ($M = -2.09$). No other effect was statistically significant (Table 2).

We also performed simple effect tests within the conversion conditions and the tolerance conditions. Significant mean comparisons resulting from these analyses are depicted with the subscripts in Table 2.

In summary, the results revealed that minorities successful at raising tolerance within a group, but not those successful at converting group members to their position, significantly decreased their expectations for social conflict within the group. Also, minorities successful at raising tolerance had significantly lower expectations for social conflict than did minorities successful at converting group members to their position, but the reverse was found for unsuccessful (stable) minorities. The results also revealed the anticipated higher expectations for social conflict among changed majorities than among stable majorities, irrespective of type of influence they exerted.

Mediational Analysis

To examine whether the effects of experimental conditions on group identification were mediated by social conflict expectations, two sets of regression analyses were conducted, as recommended by Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998): First, a set of regression analyses was conducted within the initial minority position to test the hypothesis that the type of influence moderates the effect of change in the initial minority position on expectations for social conflict, which in turn leads to a differential identification with the group. A second set of analyses was conducted within the initial majority position to test the hypothesis that regardless of type of influence, change away from the majority position increases expectations for social conflict, which in turn reduces identification with the group.

Social Conflict Expectations Mediate the Effects of Change in the Initial Minority Position via Conversion on and Tolerance of Group Identification

Consistent with the ANOVA results, the first set of analyses within the initial minority position revealed that a Type of Influ-

ence \times Change interaction term, from a set of predictors that included both lower level terms and that predicted group identification ($B = -0.74$), $t(129) = -3.97$, $p < .001$, as well social conflict expectations ($B = 0.67$), $t(129) = 5.34$, $p < .001$. When the hypothesized mediator, social conflict expectations, was added to the original set of predictors, its predictive contribution emerged as significant ($B = -1.03$), $t(129) = -7.64$, $p < .001$, whereas the contribution of the two-way interaction term was reduced to insignificance ($B = -0.05$), $t(129) = -0.32$, *ns*. The reduction proved significant ($Z = -4.34$, $p = .001$). Social conflict expectations accounted for a 93% reduction in the direct effect. An alternative set of analyses revealed that the reverse mediation pattern was not as powerful as the predicted mediation pattern.³

Social Conflict Expectations Mediate the Effect of Change in the Initial Majority Position on Group Identification

A second set of analyses within the initial majority position revealed that only change predicted group identification ($B = -1.72$), $t(129) = -11.73$, $p < .001$, and social conflict expectations ($B = 1.84$), $t(129) = 18.93$, $p < .001$. When the hypothesized mediator, social conflict expectations, was added to the original set of predictors, its predictive contribution emerged as significant ($B = -0.88$), $t(129) = -5.70$, $p = .05$, whereas the contribution of change was reduced to insignificance ($B = -0.10$), $t(129) = -0.30$, *ns*. The reduction was significant ($Z = -5.44$, $p < .001$). Social conflict expectations accounted for a 94% reduction in the direct effect. An alternative set of analyses revealed that the reverse mediation pattern was not as powerful as the predicted mediation pattern.⁴

Additional Analyses Comparing Integrated and Rejected New Minorities

To test our hypothesis that in the aftermath of social change, reactions of integrated new minorities would be less negative than would reactions of rejected new minorities, an additional set of analyses was performed. Specifically, we compared reactions of the participants who lost their initial majority but remained accepted in the group (integrated new minorities) and those who lost their initial majority position to become a deviant minority within a group (rejected new minorities). These analyses revealed that integrated new minorities ($M = 0.16$, $SD = 1.03$), in comparison with rejected new minorities ($M = -1.03$, $SD = 0.91$), had significantly stronger identification with the group, $F(1, 32) = 33.97$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .51$. Their expectations for social conflict were weaker ($M = 0.41$, $SD = 1.42$) than were those reported by rejected new minorities ($M = 1.44$, $SD = 1.26$), although the difference only approached significance, $F(1, 32) = 3.6$, $p < .07$, partial $\eta^2 = .10$. Mediation analysis revealed that the type of advocacy that effected social change predicted the new minorities' identification with the group ($B = 0.88$), $t(32) = 5.83$, $p = .001$, and social conflict expectations ($B = -0.44$), $t(32) = -1.88$, $p < .07$. When the hypothesized mediator, social conflict expectations, was added to the type of minority advocacy as a predictor, its predictive contribution emerged as significant ($B = -0.42$), $t(32) = -3.08$, $p < .01$, whereas the contribution of the type of advocacy was significantly reduced ($B = 0.70$), $t(32) = 4.16$, $p < .01$; $Z = 2.00$, $p = .05$. Social conflict expectations

accounted for a 21% reduction in the direct effect. An additional set of analyses revealed that the reverse mediation pattern was not significant.⁵

Taken together, the results provided support for the hypothesis that social change via increased tolerance, in comparison with social change via group conversion, altered reactions of winning minorities but not losing majorities. Compared with their unsuccessful counterparts, successful minorities who advocated for tolerance, but not conversion, significantly increased their expectations for conciliatory regulation of differences and, consequently, their identification with the group. It is important to note that successful minorities differed significantly, depending on how they achieved their success: Those advocating tolerance, in comparison with those seeking conversion, had significantly stronger expectations for conciliatory regulation of differences and resultant stronger identification with the group. Whereas type of advocacy moderated the effects of change in the initial minority position, it did not alter reactions to change in the initial majority position. As hypothesized, losing majorities showed similarly strong expectations for conflict over differences and low identification with the group, regardless of whether they lost support advocating tolerance or seeking conversion. In comparison with their successful counterparts, unsuccessful majorities (new minorities) increased expectations for conflict and disidentified from the group similarly, regardless of what they advocated. The relationship between social conflict expectations and group identification appears dynamic, such that social conflict expectations influenced identification with the group, which in turn reinforced social conflict expectations. Our findings suggest that the social conflict to group identification path may be stronger than the reverse path.

Although the reactions of losing majorities (new minorities) did not differ depending on what they advocated, the reactions did differ depending on the meaning of the losing majorities' new position within a group. When the losing majorities' position was integrated within a group, the losing majorities showed significantly stronger expectations for conciliatory regulation of differences and resultant stronger identification with the group than when the losing majorities' position was rejected as newly deviant within the group.

³ To examine a possibility of the reversed mediation, an alternative set of analyses was conducted with group identification as a mediator of the effects of change in the initial minority position via different modes of influence on expectations for social conflict. These analyses revealed that with the addition of group identification to the original set of predictors, the effect of the interactive term on social conflict expectations was reduced to $B = 0.32$, though it still remained significant, $t(129) = 3.20$, $p < .01$; $Z = 3.51$, $p = .001$. Group identification accounted for a 51% reduction in the direct effect.

⁴ An alternative set of analyses testing the reverse mediation revealed that with the addition of group identification to the original set of predictors, the effect of change on social conflict expectations was reduced to $B = 1.17$, though it still remained significant, $t(129) = 8.28$, $p < .001$; $Z = 3.51$, $p = .001$. Group identification accounted for a 36% reduction in the direct effect.

⁵ An additional analysis testing the reverse mediation revealed that group identification did not mediate the effect of the type of advocacy that effected social change on new minorities' expectations for social conflict ($Z = -1.23$, *ns*).

Discussion

This study provided strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that social change has different consequences, depending on whether it was brought about by successful advocacy for tolerance or by a quest for conversion. New majorities who rose to their position by successfully increasing tolerance for diversity within a group reacted to change more positively than did new majorities who successfully converted others to their position. In comparison with their unsuccessful counterparts who remained in the minority, new majorities successfully advocating tolerance increased their expectations that the group would regulate differences in a conciliatory (vs. confrontational) manner. Consequently, new majorities increased their identification with the group. By contrast, no comparable improvement in reactions toward the group was observed among new majorities who successfully converted most group members to their position. In spite of the success of these new majorities, they held to their belief that intragroup differences would be regulated through conflict. These new majorities' cemented expectations that differences inevitably lead to social conflict kept their detachment from the group intact. As would be expected, the process linking expectations and identification appeared dynamic. Specifically, social conflict expectations influenced identification with the group, which subsequently reinforced social conflict expectations. Our findings suggest that the former path may be stronger than the latter.

The observed pattern of results indicated that social change through successful advocacy for tolerance left a group stronger than did social change through successful advocacy for conversion. Not only did new majorities warm up to the group that accepted their plea for tolerance, but also new minorities who remained integrated in the group through its increased tolerance for diversity appeared tempered in their reactions to change. When social change transformed new minorities from the dominant faction to one-among-equals in the reconfigured group, they did not reject the group. Rather, they appeared somewhat ambivalent about it. This conclusion is suggested by the findings that expectations about regulation of intragroup differences ($M = .41$) and the resultant identification with the group ($M = .16$) were close to the scale midpoint of zero ($ts < 1.07$, ns). This stands in contrast to the intensely negative reactions observed among rejected new minorities. When group conversion transformed them from a dominant force to an inferior faction, they came to believe that intragroup differences would be settled through social conflict. Consequently, they did not identify with the group. Taken together, our findings indicate that in the currency of social identification, social change via group conversion is more expensive than is social change via increased tolerance.

Overall positive reactions to social change via increased tolerance do not imply that advocacy for tolerance invariably strengthens a group. When it successfully maintained the status quo, advocacy for tolerance did not result in any more positive reactions toward the group than did advocacy for conversion. It is important to note that whatever the nature of their advocacy, majorities who successfully maintained the status quo believed that the group would regulate differences through a socially desirable, conciliatory negotiation. Whereas this belief is consistent with advocacy for tolerance, it is inconsistent with advocacy for conversion. Thus, majorities who successfully sought conversion to their position

likely engaged in a self-serving bias. The self-serving nature of their beliefs is suggested by the clearly opposing reactions of a faction whose differences they would have to negotiate—minorities who (unsuccessfully) challenged the status quo by advocating conversion to their position. These minorities strongly believed that differences would be settled through social conflict.

In contrast to stable majorities, stable minorities were differentially sensitive to the maintenance of the status quo, depending on whether it meant rejection of their request for tolerance or conversion. Minorities reacted more negatively to the former than to the latter. Rejection of their plea for tolerance likely signaled to minorities that any kind of disagreement with a majority would escalate into social conflict. Not surprisingly, minorities refused to identify with the group dominated by such an intolerant majority. Their detachment from the group was so profound that it surpassed that observed among minorities who unsuccessfully advocated conversion. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, minorities advocating tolerance appeared less tolerant of group rejection than were those seeking conversion.

Taken together, our findings about reactions to successful and unsuccessful advocacy for tolerance suggest that advocacy of tolerance may have a Janus face. Whereas advocacy of tolerance is beneficial when successful, it appears harmful when unsuccessful. The harmful effect was evident in reactions of both majorities and minorities who unsuccessfully advocated for tolerance. Unsuccessful advocacy that came after an initial success severed ties to the group. Consistently unsuccessful advocacy fortified rejection of the group. At the behavioral level, this rejection of group identity could translate into an exit from the group. Worse yet, it may translate into aggression against the group when exit from the group is not viable. It is possible therefore that a failure to open others' mind may close one's own.

General Discussion: Motives for Spreading Tolerance Versus Seeking Conversion

In the aftermath of social change that elevates tolerance within a group, identification with the group is significantly increased among successful minorities and only moderately decreased among once dominant majorities whose position is turned into one-among-equals. Change appears to come at a moderate cost in terms of group identification, leaving the group reasonably strong to cope with possible subsequent challenges. By contrast, in the aftermath of social change that converts a faction to the minority position, group identification remains low among successful minorities but decreases dramatically among newly rejected former majorities. Change appears to come at a substantial cost in terms of group identification, leaving the group fragile and vulnerable to threats that may follow in the aftermath of change (Harper, 1998; Prislin & Christensen, 2005a).

The obtained pattern of results substantiates our reasoning about conversion and tolerance as fundamentally distinct forms of change. It could be argued that conversion represents a revolutionary change in that it includes the overthrow and rejection of an initially dominant (majority) position and its substitution by an initially inferior (minority) position. This change does not presume a common ground necessary for the formation of (and identification with) a superordinate category, at least not immediately after it occurs (Prislin & Christensen, 2005b). Common ground, on the

other hand, is the essence of tolerance. It is important to note that it is grounded in a principle that equalizes diverse positions within a group. Thus, the unity of diversity is achieved by acceptance of disparities rather than their derogation or negation (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). Although acceptance of diversity is not as likely a basis for identity as a specific, homogenizing characteristic is, diversity nevertheless may serve as a defining feature of the group (Devos, Comby, & Deschamps, 1996; Hutchinson, Jetten, Christian, & Haycraft, 2006; Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002). It is argued that in some cases, including multicultural groups, diversity should serve as a defining characteristic (e.g., Berry, 1984). This prescription is supported by findings showing that appreciation for (Hewstone & Brown, 1986) and prototypicality of diversity promote positive relationships among factions within a group (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003). Our results indicate that appreciation for diversity also promotes identification with group when it undergoes social change.

What may motivate minorities to seek social change by advocating tolerance rather than seeking conversion to their specific position? It is unlikely that this choice is driven by their desire to increase identification with the group. A more probable cause is minorities' need for acceptance and belonging. Traditionally, it has been assumed that the need to belong motivates yielding to social influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Prislin & Wood, 2005). Yet, there are limits to this means of need satisfaction. Because belonging is experienced as a state of cognitive merging of the included parties (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), it is not likely to be fully satisfied if minorities give up their positions or forgo their identities. The strategy of yielding to social influence may be more efficient in satisfying minorities' need for affiliation than is integration. A more efficient strategy for integration would be to advocate tolerance for diversity. Thus, belongingness needs may motivate efforts to maintain conciliatory relations among different segments of the group. Indeed, racial minorities prefer multiculturalism that respects cultural differences within a group as opposed to assimilation that requires their yielding to the dominant culture (Verkuyten, 2005). They also feel more accepted by racial majorities when their distinct perspectives are recognized as valuable (Mendoza-Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis, & Pietrzak, 2002). Recognition of diversity as valuable allows minorities to integrate themselves and others into a superordinate category without any of the included parties sacrificing their original position or identity (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). Although identification with the superordinate category probably is not the minorities' primary goal in advocating tolerance, our results indicate that it nevertheless occurs. Thus, the entire group may benefit from minorities' successful pursuit of their need to belong.

In their pursuit of social change, minorities sometimes seek conversion rather than tolerance. When, as it is often the case, access to resources is limited to those in the majority, minorities should be motivated to seek social change primarily for instrumental reasons. That is, minorities should seek others' support as a means toward achieving other goals. Instrumentally motivated minorities should be more likely to seek conversion to their position rather than to advocate for tolerance because conversion brings the status that delivers the desired goods. For example, minority parties in majoritarian political systems seek converts to

their ideological positions in order to gain political power (Levine & Karboo, 2001; Smith & Diven, 2002). Their transformation to a majority invariably advances their instrumental interests but rarely benefits the superordinate group interests. Thus, our findings about a lack of identification with the group in the aftermath of change via conversion may have some external validity.

Another motive that is more likely to inspire recruitment of converts than advocacy for tolerance is social validation (Erb & Bohner, 2001; Festinger, 1954). Social validation confers a sense of correctness to a minority position. Of course, minorities must have an initial sense of correctness in order to dissent. Their initial sense of correctness likely originates from nonsocial or remotely social factors. Any uncertainty they may have about correctness of their position can be resolved by converting others to their position rather than by yielding to the normative position (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hodd, & Turner, 1990). To survive, their initial sense of correctness must receive broader social support. This support, which only converts can provide, transforms minorities' subjectively correct dissent into a consensual, objectively correct position synonymous with reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). Our research suggests, however, that minorities successful at redefining reality may not be overly enthusiastic about the very same group that made such a redefinition possible.

These speculations about the motivational underpinnings of strategies that minorities use in their pursuit of social change should be tested in future research. The trio of motives that we consider here, though prevalent in the social influence literature (Prislin & Wood, 2005), most likely does not exhaust minorities' motivational agenda. As Moscovici and Pérez (2007) recently suggested, minorities who are often discriminated against may be motivated to restore social justice, portraying themselves as victims and seeking compensation for discrimination. A study of minorities-as-victims revealed that these minorities created a sense of guilt in their (majority) targets, who then agreed to the compensation request but continued to harbor prejudice against the minorities. Rather than improving minority acceptance, compensation appeared to sustain their exclusion. As these pioneering attempts illustrate, research on minority influence would benefit from recognizing that minorities may be uniform in their quest for social change but not in their motives for social change. Understanding what drives minorities' quest for change may help to predict how they will go about effecting change and how they will react to success or failure. If, as some argue, the history of the world is the history of minority influence, then knowing what drives minorities may be a first step toward understanding what the world is like when minorities prevail.

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